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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION:S ETTING UPAGOVERNMENT
Obama’s Ethics Agenda: The Challenge of
Coordinated Change
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Obama’s “ethics agenda” is the most ambitious ever set out by a new administration. It
promises a tougher approach not only to the usual problems such as conﬂict of interest and the
revolving door, but also to broader challenges such as political inﬂuence on career ofﬁcials and
lack of transparency in government. The goals of the agenda are a step forward insofar as they
focus more on improving the democratic process than disciplining political miscreants. But the
means relied on to carry out the goals are less impressive. They perpetuate a major deﬁciency
of the current ethics regime—its disjointedness, which undermines the transparency and account-
ability necessary for a robust democracy. What is needed is a coordinated approach, led from
the White House itself, that takes a more comprehensive view of ethics regulation throughout the
government.
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ment.Every president in recent years has sooner or later found his administration 
disrupted  for  some  period  of  time  by  major,  often  unexpected  and  sometimes 
unnecessary,  episodes  of  ethical  controversy.  Early  in  his  administration,  Bill 
Clinton proposed tough post-employment standards, and promised a new regime 
of  integrity  in Washington. Then  followed  the  travails  of Whitewater,  Monica 
Lewinsky, Henry Cisneros, and Mike Espy among others. Few of the Clinton 
administration scandals led to indictments, let alone convictions. But the largely 
unwarranted sensationalism of several of the scandals and the cumulative effect of 
all distracted the administration and depleted its political capital.  
On his second day in office, George W. Bush told his staff: “[W]e must 
remember  the  high  standards  that  come  with  high  office.  …  I  expect  every 
member of this administration to stay well within the boundaries that define legal 
and ethical conduct. This means avoiding even the appearance of problems.”
1 By 
the end of his second term, more than a dozen of his appointees had been found 
guilty of serious offenses or forced to resign as a result of ethics scandals. The 
damage extended to at least nine agencies and departments.
2  
Obama  will  certainly  not  suffer  a  Lewinsky-style  disgrace,  and  almost  as 
certainly nothing like the scandal-ridden years of Bush’s second term. He faces a 
special challenge in this area nevertheless. He has made ethics a signature issue. 
Yet he abandoned public financing in his campaign—rightly observing that the 
system was “broken,” but without suggesting much about how to fix it. The chair 
of his vice presidential search and his nominee for Secretary of Commerce had to 
withdraw because of conflict of interest problems. His Secretary of State’s spouse 
heads a Foundation that creates potential conflicts. His nominees for Treasury, 
Health and Human Services, and the new position of chief performance officer 
ran into trouble for failing to pay taxes in the past.  
The  unprecedented  euphoria  that  greeted  his  arrival  will  carry  his 
administration through any controversies that might arise in the first 100 days 
(and probably beyond). His nominees have already escaped the severe censure 
and  forced  withdrawals  that  some  of  those  in  previous  administrations  have 
suffered  for  lesser  transgressions.  But  as  he  makes  the  hard  choices  that  the 
economy, national security, health care, and other issues require, and more than 
occasionally fails to locate that common ground he admirably seeks, he will need 
to call on large reservoirs of personal trust and public confidence. Whether those 
                                                      
1 He added: “My White House counsel, Al Gonzalez, is my point man on these issues. If you have 
even a hint of ethical doubt, I urge you to talk to Al.” [President Bush’s Remarks at the Swearing-
In  Ceremony  for  New  White  House  Staff,  January  22,  2001.    http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS.0101/22/se.02.html.] 
2  Offenders  held  high  positions  in  Interior,  Justice,  Homeland  Security,  Housing  and  Urban 
Development, Labor, the General Services Administration, the Office of Management and Budget, 
the Food and Drug Administration, and the Office of the Vice President. 
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of ethics.  
Even without this special challenge, the ethics regime in Washington needs 
attention. Its integrity stands in question, partly because of the ethical lapses of 
the Bush administration during the past eight years. More generally, government 
ethics needs attention because it has not received a comprehensive review either 
in Congress or the White House since at least the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.
3 
Such a review would also provide the opportunity to consolidate and write into 
law the ethics rules now established by executive orders, which come and go with 
changing administrations. 
Some of the scandals in previous administrations could have been prevented, 
and those that could not have been, including those that were exaggerated by the 
press,  could  have  been  handled  more  effectively.  But  more  rigorous  vetting 
procedures and more skillful political responses, useful though they may be, are 
not the answer. Presidential nominees are already subjected to extensive reviews 
by the White House Ethics Office, the Clearance Counsel, and the FBI before 
their names are sent to the Senate. The ethics effort has been overly focused on 
individuals—trying to make sure that they comply with the rules, and responding 
when they do not. It has given less attention to the institutional structures in which 
individuals act—failing to analyze sufficiently the patterns of conduct, systematic 
incentives, and general practices in which ethics regulation takes place.  
What is needed is institutional reform that takes a more comprehensive view 
and  adopts  a  more  coordinated  approach.  More  focus  on  developing  coherent 
institutional  policy  than  on  responding  to  actual  and  potential  individual 
culpability would better serve both the administration and the democratic process. 
Obama’s ethics agenda moves in this direction, though not yet far enough.
4  
 
                                                      
3  Public  Law  No.  101-194,  Ethics  in  Government  Act  of  1978  (P.L.  95-521,  92  Stat.  1824) 
amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
of 2007 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 101 et seq. and 5 U.S.C. § 7353; 5 C.F.R. § 2635, and 41 C.F.R. §§ 
301-1  and  304-1.  The  Ethics  in  Government  Act  was  enacted  under  the  first  Bush,  whose 
administration, perhaps not incidentally, can boast a cleaner ethics record than most. 
4
 The agenda, featured on the campaign website as “The Obama-Biden Plan,” was transferred to 
the White House website at noon on January 20, and then almost immediately replaced with this 
notice: “The ethics section is currently being revised to reflect President Obama’s Executive Order 
concerning Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel, issued on January 21, 2009. 
Please check back soon.” The references to the “original agenda” that follow are to this document 
at  http://change.gov/agenda/  ethics_agenda.  The  new  Executive  Order  is  available  online  at 
whitehouse.gov. 
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In one sense, ethics should not have a high priority, given all the other pressing 
issues. It is not as urgent as the economy or the war in Afghanistan. That is partly 
why it is at risk of neglect. “Please check back soon” could easily become the 
agenda’s permanent label. But in another sense, ethics is the most important issue 
because the efforts to deal with all of the others can be disrupted if it is neglected. 
Like a low-grade virus that quietly wears down one’s strength, and then erupts 
into a major infection at unpredictable and unwelcome moments, ethics lapses can 
steadily sap the strength of the body politic, and leave its leaders vulnerable at the 
most inopportune times.  
Government ethics is often neglected not just because there are other more 
pressing  issues,  but  also  because  there  are  some  persisting  conceptions  of  its 
purpose. Ethics regulation is intended not mainly to prevent crimes (that is what 
the law is for), and not merely to promote favorable public relations (that is what 
political operatives are for). Its main purpose is to create and sustain confidence in 
government—to  give  the  public  reasonable  assurance  that  public  officials  are 
making decisions on the merits for the right reasons. To be sure, ethics regulation 
is also supposed to create incentives to make decisions on the merits, but for that 
purpose other methods are available and more effective—making sure that honest 
and qualified people are appointed, for a start. Ethics regulation assumes that most 
officials  are  honest.  It  would  not  be  sustainable  otherwise.  The  rules  are  to 
provide reassurance, not to instigate recriminations. The failure to appreciate this 
core  purpose  is  the  source  of  some  of  the  most  common  resistance  to  ethics 
regulation. 
Some critics acknowledge this purpose of ethics regulation in principle but 
question its value in practice. The costs are not worth the benefits, they say. The 
most commonly mentioned cost is the presumed negative effect on recruitment. 
The  regulations  are  burdensome  and  invasive,  and  consequently  discourage 
talented people from serving in government. There is surprisingly little systematic 
evidence  about  this  supposed  effect.  The  author  of  the  most  extensive  recent 
discussion claiming that the effects are negative acknowledges the “absence of 
consistent data on the percentage of people invited to join an administration who 
decline to do so and the reasons they cite for declining.”
5 He relies largely on 
comments  from  senior  officials  in  previous  administrations  who  had 
responsibility for personnel appointments. The evidence consists of statements 
from  these  officials  that  candidates,  usually  unnamed,  withdrew  from 
consideration because of the prospect of dealing with the regulations.  
                                                      
5 G. Calvin Mackenzie, Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make Government Ethical? (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 125-36. 
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cases the complaints about the regulations are the primary reason for declining to 
be considered or refusing offers of appointment. Candidates, especially those in 
lucrative private-sector positions, have plenty of other reasons to turn down public 
office. For some candidates, the regulatory burden may be a convenient excuse, 
more respectable or at least easier to explain than their real reasons. Finally, to the 
extent that the regulations are a disincentive, we do not know what exactly is 
discouraging candidates: the prospect of filling out the forms, disclosing private 
matters,  having  to  divest  some  holdings,  or  accepting  restrictions  on  post-
employment lobbying.  
Some  of  these  burdens  have  been  made  less  onerous  in  recent  years;  for 
example,  when  nominees  divest,  they  are  given  a  certificate  of  divestiture 
allowing them to defer capital gains tax (a device that enables some nominees to 
actually benefit). Other burdens could be eased by changes in the regulations, but 
some are serving their purpose in discouraging people who should be discouraged 
from  government  service.  Some  conflicts  should  in  fact  be  disqualifying. 
Furthermore,  candidates  who  do  not  sufficiently  appreciate  the  importance  of 
maintaining public confidence may not be the most suitable appointees. In any 
case, it would be desirable to conduct systematic empirical studies of the effects 
of ethics regulation on recruitment, a project that an administration committed to 
pragmatic  policy  making  should  favor.  But  given  the  surplus  of  talented 
individuals  eager  to  serve  in  the  new  administration,  the  concern  about  the 
difficulties of recruitment are not likely to seem pressing. An inspiring leader 
evidently  can  induce  many  able  people  to  discount  the  inconveniences  of  the 
ethical scrutiny. 
Another objection about the value of ethics regulation is that, even if the 
costs are less than critics believe, the benefits are less than the proponents of 
regulation claim. The “vast expansion of ethics regulation,” it is said, has not done 
much if any good.
6 The rules seem to have become stricter, but ethical conduct 
and trust in government have not improved, and may have worsened. To be sure, 
trust in government has declined, but whether ethics regulation contributed to the 
decline or prevented it from becoming worse has not been shown. The conclusion 
would be hard to establish either way because the effects of ethics regulation are 
likely to be overwhelmed by the consequences of deception and other misconduct 
by high officials in recent years. Also, any positive effects on trust, if they exist, 
may not show up directly in public opinion surveys; they are more likely to work 
indirectly through the initial influence on opinion leaders. It would be useful to try 
to analyze which kinds of regulations opinion leaders and other citizens think are 
more or less important, and what kinds of misconduct they regard as more or less 
                                                      
6  Mackenzie, pp. 86, 107-14. 
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observations can be made that cast doubt on this argument that regulation is not 
beneficial.  
First, the rules for the executive branch have not in fact become significantly 
stricter in the period of the greatest decline in trust. With the exception of post-
employment  restrictions,  the  federal  ethics  standards  have  been  “basically  the 
same” as those adopted by the Johnson administration more than 40 years ago 
(though the administrative apparatus and paperwork have obviously expanded).
7  
Second, the impression that unethical behavior has increased or at least not 
declined may be a consequence of the regulatory regime itself, which has raised 
the salience of ethics issues. The impression may also be the result of greater 
disagreement about ethical standards as more people from diverse backgrounds 
and with different values come to play a larger role in politics. In both these 
respects, the resulting ethical controversy should be welcomed. It is more healthy 
than  ethical  silence  in  democratic  politics  even  if  the  immediate  effect  is  an 
increase in distrust.  
Finally, whether or not ethics regulation has a minimal effect on trust, it is 
required by the principles of democracy. There is little evidence that campaign 
debates  change  many  people’s  minds,  yet  we  believe  that  candidates  should 
engage in them. Similarly, holding public officials to high standards of ethics is 
part of what makes our government a democracy: officials should be accountable 
for  making  decisions  for  the  right  reasons.  Ethics  regulation  supplements 
elections and other imperfect devices of accountability.  
Although more systematic empirical study of the effects of ethics regulation 
would be valuable, reform of the current regime does not have to wait for further 
evidence. The Obama administration has correctly identified a number of areas 
that  need  attention.  The  process  of  trying  to  make  changes  is  itself  likely  to 
generate more information about the strengths and weaknesses of various rules 
and policies. The officials who have run the ethics regime, those who have been 
subject  to  it,  and  independent  outside  experts  constitute  a  rich  source  of 
accumulated knowledge in this area, which can be tapped as the reform efforts go 
forward.  
Although the reforms may have to be incremental, they should be considered 
from a more comprehensive perspective than has prevailed in the past. The most 
serious deficiency of the current regime is its disjointedness: no one is responsible 
for  considering  the  system  of  regulation  as  a  whole,  and  consequently  the 
standards  and  the  procedures  for  administering  them  lack  the  consistency  and 
transparency necessary to serve the aims of ethics regulation. Obama’s reform 
                                                      
7 Gregory S. Walden, On Best Behavior: The Clinton Administration and Ethics in Government 
(Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1996), pp. 61-62.  
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are undertaken with a more coordinated approach embracing the whole ethics 
regime. To appreciate both the importance of his agenda and the need for such an 
approach,  we  can  examine  the  most  prominent  proposals  that  the  new 
administration  has  promised  to  address  in  its  “ethics  agenda,”  those  that  are 
intended to “free the executive branch from special interest influence,” and “shine 




 “Close the Revolving Door” 
 
When  Bill  Clinton  came  into  the  White  House,  he  announced  that  he  would 
impose the toughest ethics standards in history for his appointees. Senior officials 
could not lobby their former agencies for five years and could never lobby on 
behalf  of  foreign  governments  after  they  left  office.
9  But  just  before  leaving 
office,  he  revoked  the  order,  claiming  it  had  served  its  purpose.  Because  the 
Republicans were taking over, his counsel said, Clinton appointees  would  not 
have many opportunities to influence their former agencies. (But then why would 
allowing  the  prohibition  to  stand  have  been  such  a  heavy  burden?)  Clinton’s 
revocation  provided  a  convenient  excuse  for  those  in  the  incoming  Bush 
administration who did not want to be bound by the stricter rule. Ethics regulation 
waned as ethics violations waxed. 
Obama’s executive order, issued on his first day in office, revives the Clinton 
provisions but with some significant changes—most but not all in the direction of 
stricter  regulation.
10  The  five-year  ban  on  influencing  one’s  former  agency  is 
reduced to two (though still a year longer than the statutory limit under which the 
Bush administration operated for all but very senior officials). Also, Clinton’s 
order banned all senior officials from trying to influence any executive agency on 
matters  in  which  they  had  personal  involvement.  Under  Obama’s  order,  only 
officials who become registered lobbyists are subject to that broad a ban, and then 
                                                      
8 See http://change.gov/agenda/ethics. The agenda is divided into five sections: “Shine the Light 
on Washington Lobbying,” “Shine the Light on Federal Contracts, Tax Breaks and Earmarks,” 
“Bring  Americans  Back  into  their  Government,”  “Free  the  Executive  Branch  from  Special 
Interests,  and  “Spend  Taxpayer  Money  Wisely.”  In  each  section,  there  are  several  proposals 
intended to promote the stated goal, though none is as specific as an executive order or legislative 
bill.  
9  Executive  Order  12834  of  January  20,  1993,  “Ethics  Commitments  by  Executive  Branch 
Appointees.”  Notice  also  that  the  prohibition  applies  not  only  to  registered  lobbyists,  but  to 
anyone whose job involves trying to influence the government on a regular basis. This is broader 
than the scope of the rules that the Bush and Obama administrations and Congress adopted.  
10 “Executive Order – Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel,” January 21, 2009.   
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrder-EthicsCommitments/. 
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lobbyists  more  strictly:  they  may  not  lobby  any  “covered  Executive  Branch 
official” (which includes the White House senior staff and most other high level 
officials). In addition, Obama’s appointees must look a gift lobbyist in the mouth. 
The current law already bans gifts of more than $20 in value but now officials 
may  not  accept  “any  gratuity,  favor,  discount,  entertainment,  hospitality,  loan, 
forbearance, or other item having monetary value.”
11 The exception remains for 
gifts from personal friends—of whom Jack Abramoff evidently had many.  
The most significant change—and it is a definite advance—is that Obama’s 
order looks to the past as well as the future. Where officials enter the revolving 
door from is now as important as where they go when they exit. For the first two 
years of their service, political appointees may not participate in a “particular 
matter” involving “specific parties” that is directly and substantially related to 
their former employer or clients. The language (which is the same as the post-
employment restriction) is more limited than it might appear. It does not cover 
that vast range of government business that affects an entire industry rather than a 
single party, but it is a step forward as far as it goes. The rule is stricter for former 
lobbyists:  they  may  not  participate  in  “any  particular  matter”  on  which  they 
lobbied, or any issue area in which the matter falls, and may not even work in an 
agency that they lobbied.
12  
The new rule is so tough that several of Obama’s nominees—notably, Deputy 
Secretary  of  Defense William  Lynn,  who  had  been  a  lobbyist  for  the  defense 
contractor Raytheon—needed to request waivers or recuse themselves from whole 
areas of policy in their departments. It remains to be seen whether the rule is 
sustainable  if  the  waivers  and  recusals  become  common.  But  the  rule  is  a 
significant  expansion  of  the  scope  of  the  revolving-door  restrictions  as  far  as 
lobbying is concerned.  
Why is it important to try to cover both entering and exiting? The limits on 
what officials do after they leave is partly intended to minimize doubts about 
whether  their  decisions  while  in  office  are  influenced  by  their  prospects  for 
employment later. But these prospects are speculative and usually not connected 
with  specific  persons  or  companies.  As  necessary  as  the  post-employment 
                                                      
11  This  definition  of  a  gift  follows  the  existing  legislation:  5  USC  101  sec.  101.  The  gift 
restrictions  are  another  area  that  would  benefit  from  a  comprehensive  review  that  aimed  to 
simplify  and  rationalize  the  rules  and  exceptions.  Some  (such  as  meals)  are  probably  over-
regulated, and others (such as travel sponsored by outside groups), under-regulated. The gifts that 
many officials value most of all—campaign contributions—do not fall under the definition at all.  
12 This is not quite as restrictive as the New York Times editorial board assumed: “[N]o one may 
serve in the Obama administration if he or she lobbied an executive agency in the preceding two 
years.”  (New  York  Times  Editorial  Board,  “The  President  Orders  Transparency,”  New  York 
Times, January 23, 2009.) 
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arriving officials bring their connections with them, and their connections are not 
only recent but specific. The risks here are more definite and the doubts more 
reasonable. Some former ethics officials believe that the entering conflicts are 
where the most serious damage is done. In the climate of the current “bail-out” 
economy,  the  restrictions  on  appointees  to  positions  who  are  to  have  major 
responsibility for financial matters have become more important than ever.  
But the fundamental reason for imposing restrictions on the revolving door in 
both directions is often lost in the preoccupation with particular individuals and 
particular decisions. The basic justification for the restrictions is based on the 
principle that the democratic process should be open on fair terms to all citizens. 
Access cannot ever be strictly equal, but it should not overwhelmingly favor those 
who make their living in Washington politics along with the special interests they 
represent. It is a matter of proportion. The growth of the lobbying industry and the 
influence  of  money  in  politics  have  shifted  the  balance  toward  a  system  that 
begins to look more plutocratic than democratic.  
This  disproportionate  access  is  a  general  problem  in  our  system.  But  the 
revolving  door  between  government  and  lobbying  firms  makes  it  worse. 
Lobbyists serve an important and valuable function in a democracy, but when 
their ranks are filled with people coming from government or waiting to return, 
and  reaping  outsized  financial  rewards,  their  activities  undermine  the  very 
practice of democratic representation. The revolving door becomes a perversion 
of the classical democratic principle of rotation in office. Instead of citizens ruling 
and being ruled in turn, politicians are lobbying and being lobbied in turn.  
The problem is more structural than individual. The individual behavior may 
not even be unethical, but the collective result over time is undemocratic. The pre- 
and post-employment rules seek to close, or at least slow down, a revolving door 
that sustains a culture of coziness, an inside-the-beltway ethos and network of 
connections that make access far easier for insiders than ordinary citizens. That 
culture also creates barriers that discourage newcomers and new ideas, stifling the 
process of challenge and renewal on which a robust democracy depends. Money 
comes  to  count  more  than  merit.  Protecting  the  integrity  of  the  democratic 
process, more than restraining the greed of the individual politicians, is at the core 
of political ethics. That goal should also guide the assessment of revolving door 
restrictions.  
 
“Free Career Officials from the Influence of Politics” 
 
In the original agenda, this goal was to be achieved by asking all new hires at the 
agencies to sign a statement declaring that they were not offered their job “solely 
on the basis of political affiliation or contribution.” Perhaps because the drafters 
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proving it is almost impossible), Obama’s executive order puts the statement more 
positively, and shifts the burden to the officials who are doing the hiring rather 
than those being hired. The new pledge is: “[A]ny hiring or other employment 
decisions I make will be based on the candidate’s qualifications, competence, and 
experience.”  The  commitment  is  admirable,  but  both  its  end  and  means  are 
underspecified.  
The pledge permits political considerations not only to play a role in hiring 
decisions (which is justifiable) but also to play a greater role than qualifications 
(which  is  questionable).  Part  of  the  aim  should  be  to  discourage  hiring  less 
qualified candidates in preference to significantly more qualified candidates, and 
to prevent hiring qualified candidates without a good-faith search for the most 
qualified. Moreover, hiring is not the only concern. Firing for political reasons is 
even more insidious, because of the chilling effect it can have on other officials. 
Senior officials should be held accountable for making sure their subordinates do 
not conduct the kind of purges that Justice Department officials carried out in 
dismissing seven U.S. attorneys in 2006.  
Less drastic and more subtle forms of political pressure are also troublesome. 
For example, political appointees in Bush’s Interior Department are alleged to 
have  “compromised  the  scientific  basis”  of  decisions  by  exerting  improper 
influence  on  career  professionals  administering  the  Endangered  Species Act.
13 
Finally, the less well-known practice of “burrowing” —the transfer of political 
appointees to the career services—can be abused for political purposes, and even 
when  well-intentioned,  can  undermine  the  integrity  and  morale  of  the  career 
services.
14 Although burrowing occurs most often at the end of an administration, 
Obama’s team may have an opportunity to reverse some of these appointments 
and in any case can take steps to limit this practice in the future.  
As the means of protecting career officials from political influence, signing a 
pledge seems a rather tepid technique. Perhaps the new administration does not 
think that much more needs to be done here than to reaffirm the commitment to a 
professional  civil  service.  It  is  true  that  the  most  egregious  types  of  political 
interference are covered by federal law and civil service regulations. The Hatch 
Act prohibits some kinds of political activity and discourages (at least indirectly) 
                                                      
13 Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director Natural Resources and Environment, “Testimony 
before the Committee on Natural Resources, House of Representatives, Endangered Species Act 
Decision Making,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 21, 2008. 
14  Barbara  L.  Schwemle,  “Federal  Personnel:  Conversion  of  Employees  from  Appointed 
(Noncareer)  Positions  to  Career  Positions  in  the  Executive  Branch,”  Congressional  Research 
Service, October 14, 2008. 
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15  Personnel  actions  must  respect  the 
nine merit principles and avoid the twelve prohibited personnel practices specified 
in the U.S. Code.
16 Department and agency heads also must follow civil service 
rules administered by the Office of Personnel Management.  
Missing from the pledge is any sense that senior officials (including those in 
the White House) should be responsible for making sure that their subordinates 
respect the independence of career officials. Also missing is any effective means 
of enforcement. The Office of Government Ethics in consultation with the Office 
of Personnel Management is charged with making sure the pledge is honored, but 
left  entirely  unclear  is  how  these  officials  can  determine  when  a  personnel 
decision  is  based  more  on  political  connections  than  on  professional 
qualifications.  Whistleblowers  (who  are  to  be  better  protected  under  Obama’s 
ethics  proposals)  may  help  expose  the  most  egregious  abuses.  But  without 
periodic review at a high level, patterns of routine abuses and the cumulative 
effects of many minor lapses throughout an administration are less likely to be 
noticed and addressed. 
The  administration  itself  has  a  strong  interest  in  making  sure  that  all 
appointees are highly qualified, but it also has a legitimate interest in making sure 
that its political agenda is carried out. There may be a fine line between legitimate 
and  illegitimate  political  considerations.  The  Attorney  General  is  justified  in 
choosing and retaining only U.S. attorneys who support the president’s priorities 
in criminal justice, but not justified in choosing and retaining only attorneys who 
decline to make decisions about prosecution on the basis of partisan politics. A 
department is not always in the best position to be the sole and final arbiter of 
these  judgments.  Without  the  capacity  for  periodic  review  of  practices  and 
policies  by  ethics  officials  directly  responsible  to  the  president,  an 
administration’s effort to respect the demands of both professionalism and politics 
is left entirely in the hands of the department and agencies, none of which are well 
placed to take a comprehensive view. 
 
“Reform the Political Appointee Process” 
 
Political appointees are, as the name implies, properly appointed partly  on the 
basis of political considerations. The Obama administration makes no attempt in 
its agenda to suggest that political affiliation should play no role. The president 
was elected to carry out a program, and he should be able to command the loyalty 
of the top officials in his administration. Of the some 8,000 positions listed in the 
                                                      
15 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326. However, the Act’s prohibition of political activity on government 
property  during  working  hours  does  not  apply  directly  to  Cabinet  officers,  senior  political 
appointees and White House staff. 
16 5 U.S.C. §§2301(b) and 2302(b). 
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those.  If  the  past  is  any  guide,  some  will  go  to  people  who  worked  in  the 
campaign, served in the previous Democratic administration, or have connections 
to prominent Democratic politicians on the Hill and in the states. That is to be 
expected, and indeed warranted: loyalty and trust are essential ingredients for any 
administration. But so is competence, and the challenge is to make sure that it gets 
at least as much weight. Obama’s agenda mentions the most notorious case where 
it  did  not:  “no  one  would  pretend  that  FEMA  Director  Michael  Brown  was 
qualified to head the agency, and the result was a disaster for the people of the 
Gulf Coast.”  
But then all that follows in the agenda is this vague declaration: “[E]very 
official will have to rise to the standard of proven excellence in the agency’s 
mission.” No doubt the new administration is confident it will not make the “heck 
of a job Brownie” mistake, and so far the quality of appointments bears out its 
confidence.  But  the  process  is  as  important  as  the  results,  and  it  is  not  as 
transparent as it should be. Most citizens and even the press cannot keep track of 
or find out much about the many mid- and lower-level appointments. Perhaps they 
can infer from the way that high-level appointments are made that the other, less 
visible ones are being made in the same way. But a better process would make 
both less obscure.  
At a minimum, the availability of the positions should be posted in advance, 
with a stated deadline for applying. The Plum Book is generally out of date by the 
time it is printed: online postings, searchable and timely, would be more useful. 
(In exceptional cases, to avoid disrupting the work of the agency, a high-level 
resignation may have to be kept confidential until a replacement is found.) It is 
not practicable (or desirable) to publicize the names of the leading candidates for 
a job (though in effect that is what often happens with high-level positions as a 
result of leaks). But for all appointments that require Senate confirmation, a brief 
comment period could be formally required after the nomination is announced but 
before the Senate committee takes up the nomination. Any comments would have 
to be made in writing and not anonymously. It would be better for all concerned if 
any disqualifying objections came out before rather than after the appointment is 
made.  
 
“Enforce Executive Branch Ethics” 
 
The  main  instrument  for  promoting  this  part  of  the  agenda  is  the  Office  of 
Government Ethics. Originally part of the Office of Personnel Management, the 
OGE became an independent agency in 1989. Its staff is strictly professional; the 
only  political  appointee  is  the  director.  Its  main  functions  are  to  review  the 
financial  disclosure  forms  of  political  appointees,  provide  ethics  training  and 
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federal  agencies.  There  are  nearly  130  “designated  agency  ethics  officials” 
scattered  throughout  the  executive  branch.  In  addition,  more  than  6,200  other 
officials have some formal responsibility for ethics.  
Despite  its  name  and  independent  status,  the  OGE  is  not  an  all-inclusive 
overseer  of  government  ethics.  Its  powers  are  mainly  advisory  (though  its 
interpretation of some rules and statutes are effectively binding). Its capacity to 
coordinate the vast network of ethics business in the executive branch is limited. 
It has not even been able to serve as a repository for public records on ethics 
activities. The current director opposed the proposal (part of the Executive Branch 
Reform  Act  of  2007)  to  make  the  OGE  a  clearinghouse  for  information  on 
lobbying contacts and to require that the information be made available to the 
public in a searchable computerized database.
17  
Obama’s  proposals  would  go  some  way  toward  strengthening  the  OGE, 
though (understandably for a document of this kind) they leave many questions 
unanswered. Before the OGE can enforce much of anything, it must be given 
some real enforcement powers. One proposal in the agenda is to give the OGE 
“strong  enforcement  authority  with  the  ability  to  make  binding  regulations.” 
Would  this  authority  include  the  responsibility  to  impose  consistent  standards 
across all agencies for ethics training and the granting of waivers for conflict of 
interest  laws?  Currently,  the  ethics  officials  in  each  agency  have  considerable 
discretion  to  grant  waivers,  and  evidently  they  deny  very  few  requests.
18 The 
OGE should have the authority necessary to make the practices uniform with due 
allowance for the special circumstances of the agencies.  
Authority  over  training  is  especially  important  because  the  educational 
mission of the OGE should receive greater emphasis. Education is more important 
than punishment in the enforcement of ethics in a democracy in which a basic 
assumption should be that most officials want to serve the public interest. With 
greater  uniformity  and  more  robust  education,  it  should  also  be  possible  to 
simplify significantly the rules and procedures for compliance—a much needed 
change that many officials would welcome. The change could also enable the 
                                                      
17 Letter from Robert Cusik to Henry Waxman, U.S. Office of Government Ethics, February 23, 
2007. Although Cusik raises some serious practical concerns, nearly all could be addressed by 
modifying the legislation, or by proposing alternative procedures for achieving the goals he says 
he  agrees  with.  The  letter  offers  no  constructive  suggestions  along  these  lines.  The  director, 
appointed for a term lasting until 2011, was nominated by the then Senate majority leader Mitch 
McConnell. 
18  “Testimony  of  Craig  Holman  Before  the  House  Committee  on  Oversight  and  Government 
Reform, On the Subject of the Executive Branch Reform Act of 2007,” Public Citizen, February 
13, 2007. 
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reports, rules and such (even those that fall outside its own authority).  
Should the OGE authority include subpoena power (which is now lacking) 
and authority to initiate prosecutions (which is now exclusively lodged in the 
Justice  Department)?  Granting  the  former  is  probably  desirable,  the  latter 
doubtful. However, the OGE should be able to conduct investigations and impose 
civil  sanctions  necessary  to  secure  cooperation.  The  investigations  should  be 
focused more on gathering information for changes in policy and procedures than 
on disciplining individuals.  
Obama’s other proposals to enforce executive branch ethics, many of which 
closely track the Executive Reform Act, represent sensible improvements. They 
include: closer cooperation with inspectors general, greater accessibility of public 
records containing information relevant to executive ethics, and new requirements 
to report all oral and in-person “lobbying contacts” between registered lobbyists 
and political appointees. Making information of this kind available in a publicly 
searchable database would better serve the purposes of ethics regulation. Officials 
would have a further incentive to avoid questionable conflicts and to file accurate 
and complete reports, and citizens would have greater assurance that they could 
discover any ethics problems that might exist. Even if few citizens ever seized the 
opportunity, its availability could enhance public confidence.  
At present, the only way to see most conflict of interest disclosures and other 
similar  information  is  by  filing  a  freedom  of  information  request  with  each 
individual agency. The OGE should have a website that makes available at least 
the public records it already collects on prior employment, individual financial 
statements, conflict of interest waivers and the office’s own enforcement actions. 
In enforcing executive branch ethics, the broader objectives of consistency and 
transparency  are  easily  lost  sight  of  in  the  inevitable  concern  with  details. 
Consistency is important for ensuring fairness to officials, and both consistency 
and transparency are essential for creating and sustaining trust in government. The 
OGE cannot serve as the ethics czar for the whole government, but it can, if given 
more  specific  and  more  potent  authority,  serve  as  an  ethics  counselor  to  the 
executive branch, and as an ethics enforcer when its counsel is ignored. 
 
“Shine the Light…” 
 
One of the most prominent themes of the Obama agenda is disclosure. It is as if 
the administration is prepared to constitutionalize Brandeis’s aphorism, “Sunlight 
is  the  best  disinfectant,  electric  light  the  best  policeman.”  In  addition  to  the 
database on lobbying contacts (broadened to include members of Congress and 
staff),  the  proposals  include  conducting  all  legislative  sessions  in  public 
(including committee mark-ups and conference committees), creating a “contracts 
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the terms of the contracts, and whether they are fulfilled), setting up a searchable 
database  that  records  tax  breaks  and  earmarks  for  individual  corporations, 
requiring a five-day public comment period before the president signs any non-
emergency bill, giving advance notice of earmarks (with the name of the sponsor 
and a written justification), disclosing all communications between White House 
Staff and outsiders on any regulatory matters (no more Cheney-style task forces), 
guaranteeing timely release of presidential records, and requiring agency heads 
and cabinet officers regularly to conduct more business in public and periodically 
to hold town hall meetings with internet access.  
As important as transparency is, it will probably need to be limited not only 
for  the  reasons  its  proponents  acknowledge  (to  protect  national  security,  law 
enforcement,  and  personal  privacy),  but  also  to  facilitate  the  political 
compromises and bipartisanship that Obama hopes to achieve. Political science 
and political sense remind us that politicians are more likely to make concessions 
and find common ground in negotiations conducted under the cover of privacy 
than in the glare of publicity. The challenge is how to strike a balance between the 
confidentiality that compromise often needs and the exposure that accountability 
usually requires.  
The demand for transparency may have to be modified in other ways as well. 
The requirements for financial disclosure, especially the dreaded 278 form, have 
become unnecessarily complicated. What is requested is no longer sufficiently 
attuned  to  the  purposes  of  ethics  regulation.  Detailed  information  is  required 
about  holdings  that  could  not  possibly  influence  any  official’s  decisions. 
Elaborate  rules  are  enforced  with  no  sensitivity  to  the  radical  changes  in  the 
nature of financial instruments in recent years. The OGE itself has recommended 
some improvements, but Congress has not yet acted.
19 In the meantime, far too 
much time is spent on financial disclosure, and too little on exposure of other 
sources of conflict, such as the contacts officials have with campaign contributors 
and prospective employers.  
 Disclosure of financial and other information relevant to conflicts of interest 
is  for  several  reasons  necessary  but  not  sufficient.  First,  what  is  disclosed  is 
generally  not  used  effectively.  Stories  on  the  financial  conflicts  are  rarely 
presented in a way that help citizens make balanced judgments about the ethics of 
how decisions are made. The media are more interested in the sensational cases, 
especially  those  that  focus  on  individual  transgressions  and  criminal 
investigations,  and  less  attentive  to  institutional  patterns  and  historical  trends. 
Second, disclosure gives officials themselves a false sense of ethical confidence. 
                                                      
19 Office of Government Ethics, “Report to Congress: Evaluating the Financial Disclosure Process 
for Employees of the Executive Branch, and Recommending Improvements to It,” March 2005.  
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their ethical responsibilities, and do not have to take any further steps to deal with 
other pressures that are bound to arise. Their ethical duty is fulfilled by filling out 
their 278s. Social scientists have found that disclosure can also “increase the bias 
in  advice  because  it  leads  advisers  to  feel  morally  licensed  and  strategically 
encouraged to exaggerate their advice even further.”
20 Third, disclosure by itself 
can be counter-productive. Disclosing a conflict of interest without offering any 
way of dealing with it merely reinforces citizens’ distrust of officials. Disclosure 
alone can further undermine confidence in government. 
 It is a good general rule, then, that there should be no disclosure requirement 
without stipulating that someone should be charged with doing something with 
what  is  disclosed.  There  are  two  general  methods  for  dealing  with  what  is 
disclosed. The most common is to create a body with authority to require the 
elimination of the conflict (through such measures as recusal and divestiture). The 
less familiar method is to create a body with the capacity to interpret, for a wider 
audience, the significance of conflicts.
21 The interpretations would focus more on 
institutional patterns and broad trends than individual cases and particular abuses. 
This could give ethical scrutiny a life after disclosure.  
 
Extending and Coordinating Ethics 
 
Obama’s agenda reaches beyond the executive branch to Congress. In addition to 
calling for tougher lobbying rules, more publicity about earmarks, and more open 
congressional sessions, the president favors an independent body to oversee and 
enforce congressional ethics.
22 He was one of the few members to go on record 
early in support of such a body. In the final months of the 110th Congress, the 
House established the Congressional Office of Ethics, a significant institutional 
breakthrough, even if the first individuals appointed to it are almost exclusively 
former  members. The  Senate  has  so  far resisted  creating  any  such  institution. 
Obama’s support could help, though this is one of those reforms that unites both 
parties against the public. Incumbents have a common interest in making sure 
ethics charges are handled by the devils they know, even colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle, rather than by the good government redeemers they suspect.  
                                                      
20  Daylian  M.  Cain,  George  Loewenstein,  and  Don  A.  Moore,  “The  Dirt  on  Coming  Clean: 
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest,” Journal of Legal Studies 34 (January 2005), 
pp. 1-25. 
21  For  some  suggestions  along  these  lines  (applied  more  broadly),  see  Archon  Fung,  Mary 
Graham, and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
22 For a discussion of such an institution, see Dennis F. Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From 
Individual to Institutional Ethics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995). 
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absent from the ethics agenda Obama posted: campaign finance reform. Having 
opted out of public financing, justifiably contending that it is broken, Obama still 
has an obligation (one he acknowledged during his campaign) to try to reform the 
system. Campaign contributors who expect and receive privileged access are no 
less a threat to the democratic process than are lobbyists. They may be even more 
sinister because their influence is harder to detect. The influence is pervasive, 
spreading  from  Congress  to  the  executive  branch  and  into  state  and  local 
government.  There  is  of  course  no  easy  solution.  That  a  good-government 
advocate as committed as Obama has seemed to move away from this issue is 
further confirmation of its difficulty.  
But even if there is no easy solution, there is good reason to keep reform on 
the  agenda,  and  to  keep  it  in  mind  as  other  reforms  are  considered  and 
implemented. Reforms in executive ethics are too rarely considered together with 
reforms in campaign ethics, even though the two obviously interact in many ways. 
Some of the most serious problems in recent years have resulted from failure to 
deal with the intrusion of fundraising activities into the business of governing. An 
important  recent  book  on  government  ethics,  by  a  former  Bush  White  House 
counsel,  argues  that  the  goals  of  executive  branch  ethics  cannot  be  achieved 
without stronger regulation of campaign practices. Among the most troublesome 
are  the  role  of  lobbyists  in  campaign  fundraising  and  the  intermingling  of 
campaign  activity  and  government  business  in  the  agencies  and  the  White 
House.
23  
The  need  for  coordinated  reform  can  be  further  brought  out  by  noticing 
several consequences of the disjointed ethics regime that currently exists. First, in 
the absence of standardization in requests for information, officials are required to 
fill  out  multiple  forms  that  ask  similar questions  but  require  slightly  different 
answers. The requirement not only unnecessarily burdens the officials but also 
produces  inconsistent  and  less  useful  sets  of  data.  Accountability  is  thereby 
impaired. Reforms that do not take into account what is already required may 
exacerbate this problem. For example, lobbyists must report contacts under the 
Lobbying  Disclosure  Act,  while  under  the  proposed  Executive  Reform  bill, 
officials  would  also  be  required  to  report  contacts  with  some  of  the  same 
lobbyists, but the information the officials and the lobbyists are required to report 
differs for no apparent reason.  
Second,  in  the  absence  of  a  central  repository  for  information,  the 
disclosures, enforcement actions, and records of similar activities cannot be used 
effectively. Even officials charged with overseeing ethics practices and policies 
                                                      
23 Richard W. Painter, Getting the Government America Deserves: How Ethics Reform Can Make 
a Difference (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 25-26, 245-53, 256-58. 
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the absence of coordinated communication, ethics officials cannot easily learn 
about successes and failures in other agencies and branches. They cannot readily 
benefit  from  “best  practices”  originated not  only  in  other  parts  of  the  federal 
government, but also in the states, some of which are more advanced in ethics 
regulation than the federal government.
24  
Finally,  without  coordinated  reform,  a  well-intentioned  change  in  one 
practice may have unintended effects on other practices, undermining the original 
purpose. For example, if rules regulating lobbying contacts and revolving door 
practices are strengthened in government agencies, lobbyists may simply devote 
more resources to campaign committees and fundraising. Just as “money, like 
water, will always find an outlet,” so influence, blocked at one opening, will find 
another.
25 The aim of course should not be to try to stop the flow of influence, but 
to recognize that efforts to regulate it require attention to all of its potential points 
of entry.  
With such an ambitious agenda for reform, we might expect that the Obama 
administration would include an equally ambitious instrument to coordinate these 
efforts.  Reaching  across  two  branches  of  government,  and  probing  into  core 
processes  of  decision  making,  the  reform  agenda  obviously  cannot  be 
accomplished all at once. It will require sustained attention for many years just to 
implement  some  of  the  reforms,  continued  oversight  to  make  sure  they  are 
working as intended, and an institutional capacity to promote further changes as 
needed.  
Existing agencies and offices should continue to play an important role, but 
they cannot serve this comprehensive function. Even if the OGE is strengthened 
as Obama proposes, its independence, an advantage for administering ethics rules, 
is  a  handicap  for  formulating  and  promoting  the  president’s  ethics  policy. 
Furthermore,  its  jurisdiction  is  limited  to  the  executive  branch,  and  more 
concerned with conflict of interest rules than with other parts of Obama’s agenda, 
such  as  the  transparency  initiatives.  The  work  of  the  Office  of  Personnel 
Management and Office of Management and Budget is certainly relevant to ethics 
regulation, but both are properly focused on other major challenges and cannot be 
expected to give ethics policy high priority. The OGE was created in part because 
the OPM was not thought to be an appropriate body to continue administering 
government ethics.  
Attorneys  in  the  Office  of White  House Counsel generally handles ethics 
matters  for  the  president’s  staff  and  screens  potential  appointees  for  ethics 
                                                      
24 For a study of ethics reform in state legislatures, see Beth A. Rosenson, The Shadowlands of 
Conduct: Ethics and State Politics (Washington: George Washington University Press, 2005). 
25 McConnell v. FEC 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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ethics policy for the president. But most of this advice concerns individual cases. 
Providing assistance in filling out the forms for appointees and the annual forms 
for all senior staff is a major task in itself. Moreover, even the policy advice, 
naturally  reflecting  the  perspective  of  lawyers,  is  focused  on  what  the  law 
requires. Wise lawyers are not legalistic in a narrow sense and are more than 
capable of taking a broad view of institutional reform. But the ethics task is too 
wide-ranging to be left to any one kind of expertise and experience. Ethics reform 
in  the  form  that  the  Obama  agenda  envisions  it  involves  not  only  rules  and 
regulations, but also the democratic process as a whole. It is nothing less than a 
program to put the principles of political ethics into practice. The task requires the 
contributions  of  political  scientists,  political  philosophers,  ethicists,  and 
organizational behavior theorists, among others.  
It  might  be  thought  that  the  breadth  of  the  task  calls  for  a  national 
commission. For a contentious problem that is well-defined and limited in scope, 
commissions can be valuable. But because they usually require bipartisanship and 
representation  of  diverse  groups  and  interests,  commissions  are  not  effective 
devices for providing specific advice to the president or reviewing his policies on 
an ongoing basis. Ethics reform is not a one-time initiative. The president needs to 
have the capacity to shape policies before they are finally proposed, and to control 
them once implemented. Commissions on Social Security and on the response to 
9-11 were appropriate, but they were no substitute for the Council of Economic 
Advisers, the National Economic Council, or the National Security Council.  
For political ethics, a single-enforcer system for the government as a whole is 
neither feasible nor desirable. But a single-coordinator system is. To carry out the 
wide-ranging agenda the president has proposed, he needs his own advisers to 
make  recommendations,  oversee  their  implementation,  and  conduct  periodic 
reviews. There are White House offices for policy on science and technology, 
AIDS, health care, drug control, privacy and civil liberties, urban affairs, energy, 
and  climate  change.  No  less  than  these—indeed  no  less  than  economic  and 
national  security  policy—ethics  policy  needs  White  House  attention.  A  body 
devoted to ethics policy—call it the Council of Ethics Advisers—should have a 
place in the Executive Office of the President.  
The Council would advise the president and his staff on the broad range of 
ethics  issues. The  Council  would  normally  not  deal  with  individual  cases  but 
would concentrate on general policies. Specifically, the Council would review 
current procedures and policies, examine the effectiveness of enforcement, report 
on trends and patterns in compliance and violations, explore best practices in the 
states  and  other  countries,  and  provide  opinions  on  relevant  congressional 
legislation. It would make recommendations to the president for new policies and 
procedures  and  try  to  ensure  that  they  are  consistent  across  the  government 
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agencies and branches.  
Such a Council would be modeled on the Council of Economic Advisers, a 
group of three economists supported by a professional staff that provides “the 
President with objective economic analysis and advice on the development and 
implementation of a wide range of domestic and international economic policy 
issues.”
26  The  members  and  the  staff  of  this  Council  come  mostly  from 
universities and research institutes. The Ethics Council staff would no doubt need 
some Washington lawyers and others with experience in the administration of 
ethics rules, but like the Council of Economic Advisers, it would also draw on 
talent  in  the  universities  and  research  institutions.  It  would  seek  to  provide 
independent and relatively objective advice to the president. These observations 
of a former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers would apply equally well 
to an Ethics Council: 
 
The academic nature of the staff and most members distinguishes the [the Council] 
from other government agencies. It generally assures a higher level of technical 
economic sophistication and of familiarity with current developments in economic 
thinking. Members and staff also use their strong links in the academic community 
to obtain advice on technical issues throughout their time in Washington. There is 
of course a price to be paid for this reliance on academic economists, especially at 
the  staff  level.  They  often  come  to  the  [Council]  without  the  institutional 
knowledge  of  some  of  the  issues  with  which  they  will  deal  and  without  any 
experience  in  the  bureaucratic  process  of  decision-making.  My  experience 
however was that most of the senior staff economists learned quite quickly to be 
effective participants, and made an important contribution to the policy debates 
because of their ability to apply economic analysis to the issues being discussed, 
and to develop new economic proposals that had not occurred to non-economist 
participants from the agencies.
27  
 
There  would  be  some  significant  differences  in  the  missions  of  the  two 
councils. The Council of Economic Advisers is supposed to provide “objective 
economic  advice.” Although  such  advice is  usually  based  on  widely  accepted 
views in the economics discipline, it is properly partisan or ideological in the 
sense that it supports the president’s policy perspective (greater or less reliance on 
the market, for example). The Ethics Council does not need to be so committed to 
a partisan program. Ethics policies are to some extent partisan in the sense that 
they reflect a distinctive conception of democratic process, which may be more 
associated with one party than another. But they are not partisan in the sense of 
                                                      
26 Council on Economic Advisers, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/ eop/cea/. 
27 Martin Feldstein, “The Council of Economic Advisers and Economic Advising in the United 
States,” The Economic Journal 102: 414 (September 1992), p. 1223. 
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Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009favoring the general policies of one party rather than the other. For that reason, the 
ethics recommendations can be formulated with an eye toward continuity and 
should be expected to be more enduring.  
Another difference comes from the fact that the ethics regime is relatively 
new, and partly for that reason much more disjointed and uncoordinated even than 
economic policy. The Ethics Council would first need to identify inconsistencies 
throughout the government before trying to develop more coherent policies. It 
would have to make a case for consistency in a regime that seems to have made 
flexibility  its  first  principle.  Finally,  the  Ethics  Council  would  be  more 
interdisciplinary.  It  could  include  members  and  staff  from  the  several  social 
sciences, philosophy, law, organizational behavior—and perhaps even economics. 
If its agenda were broadened to include bioethics and research ethics, physicians 




Obama’s  ethics  agenda  represents  change  that  ethicists  can  believe  in.  More 
importantly, it proposes change that citizens who care about the health of the 
democratic process can believe in. Obama promises to enforce tougher standards 
than those observed in the previous administration and tougher in many respects 
than any in U.S. history. Moreover, his ethics agenda is not limited to the usual 
suspects—conflicts of interest, revolving doors and improper gifts—but seeks to 
capture a whole gang of practices that threaten the integrity of the democratic 
process,  most  notably  the  enemies  of  transparency  and  accountability.  It  is 
refreshingly  focused  more  on  institutional  than  individual  ethics.  Obama 
recognizes that transparent and accountable government is necessary to sustain 
public confidence, which is a primary aim of political ethics in a democracy. Yet 
his broad agenda is not accompanied by any proposals for the comparably broad 
process that is required for carrying it forward. The deficiencies of the current 
ethics regime cannot be remedied by any agency acting alone, and the Obama 
ethics agenda cannot be advanced without sustained planning and coordination 
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